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WAYS TO THINK ABOUT THE UNITARY 
EXECUTIVE: A COMMENT ON 
APPROACHES TO GOVERNMENT 
STRUCTURE 
Michael Fitts* 
Over the past few years public law debates have invariably fo-
cused on the relative significance of legal institutions as expressed in 
formal legislative and administrative structures versus everyday poli-
tics in the resolution of policy questions. This emphasis has been par-
ticularly evident in the examination of the appropriate structure and 
distribution of responsibility for administrative decision making, in 
general, and presidential authority versus agency autonomy, in 
particular. 
In part, this increased focus on government structure has oc-
curred as a response to new issues: the past few years have seen a 
proliferation of new forms of agency structures and novel assertions of 
executive power. 1 Just as scientific breakthroughs may result from 
our confrontation with unexpected problems, so too the study of ad-
ministrative institutions may be aided by the resolution of unique ad-
ministrative dilemmas, which test the standard paradigms. 
This focus has also been facilitated, no doubt, by the perception, 
if not the reality, of increased identification of government and legal 
institutions with particular ideologies. Because different political par-
ties have dominated each branch of government for such a long pe-
riod, the stakes for allocation of institutional power have been 
unusually high. Strengthening a particular institution may not only 
improve its effectiveness but also the relative influence of a particular 
political party or ideology. 2 This effect can only have been enhanced, 
moreover, by the increased ideological polarization of the debate be-
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
1 See generally CASS SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION (1990); see also Cass 
Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal: Reconceiving the R egulawry State, 101 HARV. 
L. REV. 421 (1987). 
2 For the most part, stronger executive powers meant stronger Republican influence; en-
hanced legislative influence meant greater D emocratic control. See Michael Fitts, Can Ign o-
rance Be Bliss? Imperfect Information as a Positive Influence in Political Institutions, 88 MICH. 
L. REv. 917 ( 1990). Judicial responsibility fell in between, perhaps depending on whether one 
was speaking about the Supreme Court or the lower courts. See Peter L. Strauss, One Hun-
dred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for 
Judicial R eview of Agency Action , 87 CoLUM. L. REv. 1093 (1987). 
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tween the parties during the Reagan period and the strength of the 
assertions of executive powers during this era. 3 
Of course, the recent return to one party domination of both 
branches might lead one to expect a diminution in the temperature of 
this debate. However, one activist President, Ronald Reagan, appears 
ultimately to have been succeeded by another activist President, Bill 
Clinton. Strong presidents by their force of personality and visibility 
may test the limits of institutional powers. 4 Moreover, the change in 
institutional control brings the meaning and significance of institu-
tional design into even sharper focus . Many conservatives and liber-
als may be forced to revisit their prior statements about executive, 
judicial, and legislative powers. 5 
In this politicized environment, how do or should we attempt to 
resolve questions of institutional responsibility and power? How can 
we achieve a system of structural design which receives broad support 
and legitimacy? The purpose of this Comment is to explore how each 
of the papers in this group reflects on these questions, namely, how 
they approach structural issues. This leads me away somewhat from 
their substantive topic-the interpretative powers of the presidency 
and agencies-and focuses instead on the general institutional princi-
ples at stake in the debate. My underlying point is that, while the 
papers reach similar conclusions on the interpretative role of the Pres-
ident, they are quite different in their underlying approach. In this 
sense, they reveal something about the different literatures that seek 
to explain and justify different institutional designs. My comments 
seek to elucidate the techniques we use to justify institutional design 
and the underlying goals and tradeoffs at issue. 
What are these generic approaches? As lawyers, the first place to 
which we look in resolving such questions is ordinarily the decisions 
of the past, as captured in the text of the Constitution and constitu-
tional history, however broadly defined. Unfortunately, this obvious 
first stop invariably becomes complicated by the ambiguity inherent 
3 Any discussion of institutional powers in an academic setti ng, let alone a pol itical set-
ting, has been vastly complicated and sharpened by the substantive ends to which these powers 
would be applied. 
4 Just as a Ronald R eagan may wish to assert authority over agencies previously viewed as 
independent or poli tically neutral, so a Bill Clinton may wish to rework much of the mil itary 
or the healthcare system through executive control. 
5 One recent example is the statement of Senator George Mitchell , historically a firm 
believer in strong legisla tive powers, that a legislative limitation on homosexuals and lesbians 
in the military would be unconstitutional as an intrusion on presidential power over the 
military. 
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in historical interpretation whenever hard questions are raised. 6 Our 
roots are frequently understood only in light of current perceptions, 
interests, and theories. 
For some academics, one important theory for evaluating admin-
istrative design has been the new economics of institutions, which 
shows how legislative and administrative structures can serve through 
their formal and informal design to minimize transaction costs. 
Paralleling the economic analysis of private corporate design, 7 so-
called public choice theory offers an economic model of political and 
administrative institutions. Of particular interest of late has been the 
attempt to understand and explain the design of administrative agen-
cies as a means for facilitating ongoing legislative control and over-
sight. 8 For the most part, this so-called "congressional dominance 
literature" is positively oriented, seeking to explain how administra-
tive structures can be understood instrumentally as an outgrowth of 
the political forces in Congress, which originally secured passage of 
the legislation and sought to extend its influence into the future. At 
the same time, it has been used by legal academics to better under-
stand the problems of democratic accountability and inefficiency in 
agency performance.9 It thus can begin to offer affirmative prescrip-
tions for reforming the political economy of government performance. 
From a quite different perspective, the design of political institu-
tions has been evaluated according to the extent to which they further 
distinct normative goals. Those who believe in a particular moral phi-
losophy might be thought to focus less on questions of administrative 
procedure. Yet, normative approaches that emphasize dialogue--es-
pecially civic republicanism-are more easily focused on the question 
of procedural design. Thus, civic republican scholars have offered a 
moral defense for a variety of administrative procedures that might be 
thought to further deliberation and reflection within the executive 
branch. If the congressional dominance view seeks to understand leg-
6 For a good summary, see Cass Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 
103 HARV. L. REV. 405 (1989). 
7 See OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985). 
8 See Matthew D . McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Proce-
dures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 243 (1987); Matthew D. Mc-
Cubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: 
Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431 (1989); 
Morris Fiorina, Legislator Uncertainty, Legislative Control, and the Delegation of Legislative 
Power, 2 J.L. ECON. & 0RG. 33 (1986). 
9 See, e.g. , Michael Levine & Jennifer L. Florence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, 
and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167 (1990); Michael Fitts & 
Robert Inman, Positive Political Theory and Public Law II: Controlling Congress: Presidential 
Influence in Domestic Fiscal Policy, 80 GEO. L.J. 1737 (1992). 
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islative delegation as a response to democratic or interest group con-
trol, civic republicanism views it as a means of furthering normative 
accountability. 10 
From a more traditional perspective, legal structures can also 
further a variety of normative ends simply by establishing a precom-
mitment to certain goals and procedures at a time when the applica-
tion to individuals or groups on the future is unclear. To varying 
degrees such precommitments can be reflected in constitutions, sub-
stantive legislation, administrative structure, regulations, or simply 
judicial common law. In addition to norms of consistency and open-
ness, this is ordinarily what we mean by rule of law. 
While the substantive focus of the papers contained in this group 
varies, they each reflect distinct approaches to these structural ques-
tions. Of course, two of the papers (those of Professors Herz and 
Devins) are primarily case studies that describe how conflicts over 
unitary control have resolved themselves in particular cases; the other 
two (Miller and Lessig) are more comprehensive, seeking to develop a 
general theory of executive power derived from the Constitution. But 
in the end, their conclusions tend to be similar: presidents should be 
strong in a specific range of cases, except where there is an adminis-
trative argument for agency autonomy. 11 Even Geoffrey Miller, who 
probably falls more on the unitary executive side, concludes that "in 
practice, of course, neither the unitary nor the splintered version of 
the executive prevails." 12 
In light of this, what I find most interesting about the papers is 
the different ways they approach these issues. 13 Each of the articles 
can be seen as relying on different legal institutions and conventions in 
the resolution of policy and institutional allocation questions. To 
what extent do formal administrative and legislative structures mat-
ter, and toward what ends should they be directed-minimization of 
10 Of course, administrative law is vitally concerned with the pursuit of the rule of law 
within administrative agencies. Rule making (establishing broad principles that are later ap-
plied in individual cases) and adherence to norms of administrative consistency have been two 
of the traditional means for furthering these goals. Civic republicanism has sought to rely on 
administrative structures that further debate and discussion-presuming the existence of an 
underlying moral community-as a principle goal of administrative agencies. See Mark 
Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, !05 HARV. L. REV. 
1512 (1991); Cass Sunstein, Factions, Self-Interest and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 
VA. L. REV. 271 (1986). 
11 Neal Devins's paper, which is primarily factual, is the exception. 
12 Geoffrey P. Miller, The Unitary Executive in a Unified Theory of Constitutional Law: 
The Problem of Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 201, 206 (1993). 
13 On this level, each of them directly contributes to this more general question of how we 
should understand the operation of administrative institutions and how we should attempt to 
improve them. 
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transaction costs, promotion of civic dialogue, and/ or furtherance of 
a rule of law? And how can we reach an agreement on such goals-
through comprehensive precommitment strategies (as found, ordina-
rily, in a constitution or metaconstitution), by structural legislation, 
or by more ad hoc political bargaining? 14 These issues are similar to 
the substantive constitutional debate over abstract versus clause based 
textual analysis in constitutional law, except here the discussion fo-
cuses on alternative institutional mechanisms for resolving conflict. It 
is such issues, more than the articles' specific conclusions about the 
appropriate strength of the presidency-about which a great deal has 
already been said in this symposium-on which I will focus. By ex-
amining the mode of argument of each paper, I hope to situate them 
within this general discussion about how administrative structures 
should be created and evaluated. 
Let me begin with the two pieces that seem to call for a more 
comprehensive and formal resolution of these questions. Lawrence 
Lessig's paper sets forth to determine what the Framers actually in-
tended with respect to presidential powers and allocation of responsi-
bility. From a purely legal point of view, it is a quite interesting-and 
important-thesis. Proponents of a unitary executive have often 
tended to be adherents of constitutional originalismY Lessig argues 
that these are largely incompatible positions. After raising questions 
about the meaning of the Take Care Clause 16 and its history, Lessig 
shows persuasively that the practice both before and after the framing 
of the Constitution was quite varied and complicated, and thus cannot 
be held to sustain a unitary position. 17 Instead, Lessig relies on the 
general distinction made between the executive and administrative 
functions, which he argues should be applied today-presumably by 
Congress-under the general banner of what is a "proper" allocation 
of power. 18 
As we all know, and as Lessig recognizes, legal scholars have 
hotly debated the significance of language and history to the resolu-
tion of such questions. 19 This is not the place to summarize, let alone 
14 At stake is when and why decisions should be reso lved through formal institutions, as 
opposed to more informal methods. 
15 S ee Steven G . Calebresi & K evin H . Rhodes, Th e Structural Con stitution: Unitary Exec-
utive, Plural Judiciary , 105 HARV. L. R Ev. 1155 (1992). 
16 U.S. CONST. art. II , § 3. 
17 Lawrence Lessig, R eadings by Our Un itary Executive, 15 CARDOZO L. RE v . 175 (1 993). 
18 In other words, since the practice was sufficiently varied so as to pres ume some vague 
distinction, only future common law application, presumably by Congress, can hope to capture 
the complexity of thi s meaning. 
19 Lessig does a good job of reassessing this question in light of the new learning. My 
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enter, this extended debate. 20 Wherever one comes out in this discus-
sion, it is clear that language and history have inherent ambiguities 
based on conceptual assumptions regarding group and multi-institu-
tional intent. The passage of time further complicates the analysis, as 
the application of understandings reached in what was clearly a differ-
ent society becomes increasingly confusing. Subsequent constitu-
tional amendments-and "constitutional moments"-may further 
complicate that reasoning. 21 
In light of these issues, it is worth noting that Lessig's particular 
approach-looking in detail at the varied practice across government 
at the moment of the framing-may tend to limit his ability to genera-
lize concerning any conclusions he may draw. Lessig is clearly cor-
rect that the Framers were not of one mind about the proper 
organizational structure for the different departments. 22 In light of 
this varied practice, he shows that an originalist cannot believe in a 
clear unitary view of constitutional powers; only an application of a 
general principle of "propriety" will work. 
While this is certainly a reasonable conclusion, it is not unex-
pected given his approach. Once the complexity of the real world is 
confronted, it is frequently more difficult to generate clear general 
principles. In this sense, the more rigorous an originalist one be-
comes, and the better one understands the rich complexity of the 
world in which the Framers existed, the less one may be able to say 
about general but comprehensive principles. It is thus not surprising 
that his approach would lead to the application of a somewhat vague 
principle-''propriety"-by future congresses. Ultimately, Lessig 
seems to believe that only an incremental nonrule bound system can 
capture this complexity. 
This is certainly not to suggest Lessig is "wrong," but only that a 
different type of interpretative approach could come out differently. 
Lessig offers evidence that there was a distinction drawn between exe-
cution and administration in the constitutional history body and in 
later legislative practice. But, as with all historical claims, he makes 
implicit assumptions about who were the Framers and what counts in 
determining intent. While Lessig does make important arguments 
against some types of originalists, he surely has not ended the de-
passing over the contribution he makes is intended merely to suggest his focus is somewhat 
outside the purview of the current analysis. 
20 See. e.g., WILLIAM EsKRIDGE & DANIEL FARBER, LEGISLATION (1988). 
21 See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1991). 
22 Lessig, supra note 17, at 186. 
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bate--as I am sure he would recognize--for those who would balance 
arguments about original intent with other structural approaches. 
That is one of the differences between Lessig's paper and that of 
Geoffrey Miller, who also seeks to interpret the President's constitu-
tional authority, but ultimately argues for a comprehensive commit-
ment to substantive institutional principles. In comparison to Lessig, 
Miller's article more directly confronts the question of what level of 
generality should we evaluate the Constitution on and its historical 
meaning-namely, what metaprinciple should be used to resolve the 
inherent ambiguities in structural design? Though he gives a classical 
lawyer's response--look to the whole of the Constitution-he uses a 
far broader brush than Lessig by looking both at provisions on indi-
vidual liberties and the underlying purpose of the Constitution.23 In 
his view, "a unified theory should seek to identify concepts that or-
ganize both structures within a single model. " 24 In particular, he 
claims that the structural and individual rights sections of the Consti-
tution should be reconciled into a more general principle of govern-
ment which seeks to protect individual liberties from intrusion by 
other individuals as well as the government.25 From this perspective 
"[t]he fundamental problem of government design, according to the 
authors of the Federalist Papers, is to minimize the sum of two costs: 
(1) the costs of private expropriation and violence on the one hand, 
and (2) the costs of governmental expropriation and violence on the 
other.''26 
This approach is distinctive in two respects. First, Miller ex-
pressly attempts to answer broad questions of structural design in 
terms of basic substantive normative principles. Rather than viewing 
structure as a means for generating evolving principles over time, he 
starts with a broad normative principle against which the structure of 
government, and its evolving policy decisions, must be weighed. 
While this places supreme importance on the general acceptance and 
inclusiveness of the normative principle, it also asks an important but 
often ignored question: toward what ultimate ends should the struc-
ture of government be directed. To the extent procedure is an instru-
mental means to a substantive end, there is a place for resolving the 
appropriate ends of structural design first and moving then to ques-
23 See, e.g., CHARLES L. BLACK JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAw (1969); Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 
(1987); Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1513 
(1991). 
24 Miller, supra note 12, at 209. 
25 Economists would probably view the latter as rent-seeking. 
26 Miller, supra note 12, at 210. 
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tions of specific design of the Constitution, and the resolution of its 
necessarily ambiguous clauses. 27 This clearly is a "top down" 
nonanalogical approach to interpretation of structural design. 28 
While Lessig might argue that this "picture" holds Miller "captive,"29 
Miller presumably believes this stands as a better resolution of the full 
body of the Constitution and articulation of its underlying moral 
tradeoffs. 
The resort to general principles may also serve to foster a degree 
of abstraction and generality among decision-makers which can be 
useful in illuminating debates about institutional structure. Of course, 
the focus on the structure and procedures of agencies-as opposed to 
substantive outcomes-can itself abstract away from the particular in-
terests of individuals at a particular moment in time. Yet placing that 
structural debate in terms of abstract principles can go one step fur-
ther. 30 You can't generalize much more than by conceiving the role 
of government as a balancing of two interests. 
Yet, there is a downside to this approach, as there is with any 
comprehensive analysis, the problem of underinclusion and evolution. 
For example, for many, the role of government would seem to be 
broader than the protection of private property interests. Even from a 
traditional law and economics perspective, government intervention is 
ordinarily justified on the grounds of market externalities and high 
transaction costs, which can be subsumed under the broad goal of 
"promoting the general welfare." Indeed, several of the specific func-
tions of government agencies discussed by Miller, such as the Federal 
Reserve Board and the Environmental Protection Agency, seem to be 
justifiable on these grounds, but probably not as easily under a protec-
tion of private property and liberty theory alone. 
A limitation on redistribution raises similar questions of underin-
clusion. One goal of government may simply be to redistribute re-
27 While Miller certainly does not go as far as to require a resolution of first principles, his 
style and mode of argument certainly seeks to abstract to general principles of government 
more than any of the other papers. 
28 See Cass Sunstein, Commentary: On Analogical R easoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741 
(I 993); Richard Posner, Legal Reasoning From the Top Down and From the Bottom Up: The 
Question of Unenumerated Constitutional Rights, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 433 (1992). 
2 9 Lessig, supra note 17, at 176. 
30 At first blush this may seem odd. Reference to substantive principles often exacerbates 
conflict as participants-be they academics or real world political participants--come to un-
derstand and focus on the implications of allocations of institutional authority in terms of the 
particular substantive interests and goals that immediately matter. The veil of ignorance is 
pierced, as it were. Yet Miller's description of substantive goals is itself of such a high level of 
generality that it seems in most respects to avoid this problem. It serves as a metaconstitu-
tional principle. A host of different groups from both the traditional "Right" and "Left" can 
be seen as having their interests protected by such broad principles. 
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sources from one group to another. While the Framers may have 
wanted to make certain types of redistribution more institutionally 
difficult, to what extent should they be held to make redistribution 
institutionally impossible? If not, one probably needs a theory about 
when permissible redistribution ends and rent-seeking beginsY 
Finally, a reliance on comprehensive first principles also tends 
not to incorporate a civic republican role for government. To the ex-
tent that one views the structure of government as seeking to establish 
a process by which values will evolve over time, a flight to substantive 
principle could be viewed as cutting off debate and dialogue. Needless 
to say, a top down approach is different from a "bottom up," evolu-
tionary approach in this regard. 32 Whatever one's ultimate position, a 
variety of administrative law principles seem to have been justified on 
such grounds. 33 
All of these issues arise in a variety of different contexts. For 
example, Miller draws a distinction between the avoidance of "fac-
tion," which is presumably bad, and protection of an agency's "spe-
cialized mandate," which is presumably good. Also, he would restrict 
presidential powers in the case of the money supply due to concerns 
of "manipulation" or "short term political gain." 34 Such distinctions 
seem better understood on motivational or civic republican grounds. 
Similarly, redistributional choice probably cannot be avoided once we 
begin to confront intergenerational or temporal conflict, where gov-
ernment decisions having long term impact implicate the relative in-
terests of future versus current generations. This problem is raised by 
many of the most recent structural changes intended to reduce the 
deficit, such as Gramm Rudman or balanced budget amendments, or 
by environmental laws. As a logical matter, it is difficult to say which 
group or generation-the present or the future-should have the dis-
tributional property right. 
All of these considerations complicate one's ability to resolve cer-
tain institutional allocation questions using a comprehensive ap-
proach. Once a question of institutional power is understood to 
implicate distributional as well as dialogic goals, it becomes more dif-
3t See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justlfy More Intrusive Judicial Re-
view?, 101 YALE L.J. 31 (1991), for an argument that such a position is untenable. 
32 See supra note 27. 
33 Indeed, a great deal of administrative law can probably be understood, if not explained, 
on such civic republican grounds. The obvious examples are rule making and open govern-
ment laws. The allocation of institutional responsibility can also be understood on such terms. 
In many cases, defenses of agency autonomy, especially by neo-Weberians, rely on such 
grounds. 
34 Miller, supra note 12, at 216. 
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ficult to give directed answers. It might be possible, making certain 
strong assumptions, to apply Miller's decision rule for minimizing the 
intrusion on individual property interests and get reasonably determi-
nate answers; it seems more difficult to add to such calculations cer-
tain distributional and dialogic goals and converge on specific 
conclusions. This is not to detract from the power of Miller's insight, 
which is intended only to clarify ambiguities in the Constitution. Yet 
as he recognizes, and as Lessig argues, generality clarifies some issues 
and obscures others. 
If Miller seeks to pursue a constitutional resolution of such issues 
through comprehensive rationality, Neal Devins focuses on the oppo-
site approach-incremental decision making. He wishes to under-
stand how political actors, faced with the broad institutional 
constraints of the Constitution and legislative structural design, re-
solve questions of authority in particular controversies. His conclu-
sion: structure matters less than we think. 
Of course, Devins's paper is largely positive, not normative. 
Devins believes that administrative law scholars place too much 
causal significance on the formal structure of administrative agencies 
in explaining their decisions. Under the standard textbook paradigm, 
independent agencies are viewed as independent of presidential will 
and control, while nonindependent agencies are firmly under central 
governmental direction. Devins suggests otherwise, arguing for "the 
centrality of politics."35 Based on an illuminating review of three dis-
putes over the control of both independent and nonindependent agen-
cies, he argues that the influence of the President turns less on the 
formal independence of the agency and more on the political configur-
ation of forces in Congress, the White House, and the agency. While 
others have de-emphasized the significance of the formal distinction 
between independent and nonindependent agencies, 36 Devins does a 
good job of showing how independent agencies can be brought under 
presidential will, as well as how nonindependent agencies can resist 
that pressure. 37 
This rich history raises obvious questions about any highly pre-
dictive theory of institutional design, whether based on public choice 
or rule of law principles. Adherents of the congressional dominance 
view, for example, presume that there is a great deal of importance 
35 See Neal Devins, Political Will and the Unitary Executive: What Makes an Independent 
Agency Independent?, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 273, 275 (1993). 
36 See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the 
Fourth Branch , 84 CoLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984). 
37 Devins, supra note 35, at 311. Needless to say, I have a great deal of sympathy with this 
view. 
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and predictability to agency structure. Congressional coalitions are 
able not only to predict their future interests over time but to write in 
institutional allocation devices which will effectively further their fu-
ture will. The history Devins relates raises questions about this. As 
Devins shows, congressional framers often seem not to have thought 
about institutional questions, to have guessed wrong, or to have posi-
tively decided to ignore the issue. Indeed, the highly quixotic alloca-
tion of litigation authority across the federal government described by 
Devins underscores this point. 38 
Along similar lines, Devins reminds us that presidents may be 
ambivalent about the need for coherent strong presidential leadership. 
In his account of the Bush, Nixon, and Clinton presidencies, Devins 
reminds us that the administrations were and are quite amenable to 
appointment of different people with inconsistent views to different 
agencies, principally as a means of avoiding the conflict inherent in 
making comprehensive decisions. Strong presidential powers and in-
stitutions do not necessarily lead to clear centralized leadership with-
out a political incentive structure that offers benefits to such actions. 
In this sense what may look like a centralized comprehensive legal 
structure can produce incremental diverse results if the political in-
centives strongly run in that direction. 
At the same time, one should be wary about reading too much 
into these case studies. Devins's thesis-that politics counts-is 
clearly unassailable, as political scientists have been telling us lawyers 
for years. Indeed, in my own work, I have sought to model and test 
formally the relative significance of political resources in strengthen-
ing the presidency vis-a-vis divided and centralized congresses. 39 The 
political preferences of the actors in the White House, Congress, and 
the agency clearly effect the outcomes of decisions. But legal scholars 
of institutional design as well as adherents of congressional domi-
nance, really only suggest that structure can stimulate and organize 
political coalitions and debate, not determine outcomes.40 Even if one 
thinks that the structure of an agency is important, the goals of those 
within that structure count. How much they count is the relevant 
issue, and it is not clear that the case studies resolve that question. 
For example, while the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
38 Devins, supra note 35. See also Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence in Solicitor 
General Control of Independent Agencies (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). 
39 See Fitts & Inman, supra note 9, at 1737; Robert Inman & Michael Fitts, Political Insti-
tutions and Fiscal Policy: Evidence from the US. Historical Record, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 79 
(1990). 
40 Put another way, the Coase theorem can be used to analyze the structure of agencies as 
well as other legal allocations of property rights. 
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("EEOC") did capitulate in the Williams case, it is unclear how much 
Chairperson Thomas really cared about the issue, especially in light of 
the political resources of a popular President and an Office of Legal 
Council ("OLC") opinion that may have served as an independent 
structural constraint. Only if one were able to measure preferences of 
all the different parties could one say anything definitive about how 
important structure is. Power is the ability to impose one's will on 
others; one needs a prior specification of will of all the parties to mea-
sure power. 
Indeed, as Devins recognizes, there is some evidence in the case 
studies that structure does count. For example, Devins's review of 
the legislative history of the EEOC also reveals that legislative fram-
ers intended to put the agency into a no-man's land, under some but 
not complete presidential control. This decision was made, according 
to Devins, precisely because the Framers were trading off questions of 
enforcement and congressional control. "Congress's inability or un-
willingness to create a truly executive or independent EEOC," he ob-
serves, "set the stage for the Williams controversy." 41 Such cross 
pressures ultimately led the EEOC to change positions. In this sense, 
the legislative creators of the agency may have intended to produce 
precisely the compromise that resulted. If true, the absence of polit-
ical support in Congress at the time of the Williams controversy was 
to be expected in light of Congress's earlier views about the agency 
and what its place should be. Structure counted, though indirectly, 
through its effect on fashioning current "political will. " 
From the opposite perspective, the case of the postal service 
could be interpreted as demonstrating structure was important in al-
lowing the commissioners to resist pressures.42 Despite a furious as-
sault by the Bush administration, albeit at a time when its lame-duck 
status minimized its political resources, the commissioners appointed 
by the Reagan and Bush administrations did not capitulate. 
There is another limitation on the "political will" explanation 
which is suggested by both the Devins and the Herz case studies. In 
several cases Devins refers to the understanding of Congress that the 
EEOC was one of " its" agencies. 43 This understanding was not a re-
sult of formal institutional design, but rather of informal understand-
ings and expectations. This appears to be evidence of a common law 
of institutional powers-a type of rule of law that practitioners of in-
stitutional combat recognize but which is not written into legislation 
41 Devins, supra note 35, at 292. 
42 See id. at 298. 
4 3 See id. at 293. 
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or the Constitution. In effect it shows how prior decisions and agency 
or congressional interactions can serve informally to bind future polit-
ical behavior, even though they are not formalized into positive law. 
Certainly those of us who have practiced this type of law are familiar 
with the phenomenon.44 To put it in Devins's terms, it is a common 
law type limitation on current political wil1.45 
Of course, in the end, Devins does not express an opinion on the 
appropriate design of administrative institutions. Yet the distinction 
he draws between politics and law is fundamentally a distinction be-
tween comprehensive analysis and incrementalism. Agency struc-
tures are a consequence of longer term political arrangements under 
each of the models described above. Politics, as Devins describes it, is 
much more the application of political will in the particular context. 
By arguing for the importance of the latter, Devins reminds us that 
structure is not determinative, and that incrementalism is both an im-
portant, and sometimes a valuable means of resolving disputes. 
Michael Herz's paper offers another case study of institutional 
combat between the President and agencies, which in some ways is 
quite similar to Devins's view. Politics mattered here as well. Like 
Devins, Herz shows that the formal dependence of agency-in this 
case the Environmental Protection Agency ("EP A")-did not stop it 
from challenging centralized leadership. While ultimately the White 
House did impose its will, a nonindependent agency like the EPA was 
quite willing and able to defy White House views for an extended 
period. By bringing in supportive oversight committees and the pub-
lic, the agency was able to make the White House pay a high price for 
the imposition of its will. The formalistic distinction between in-
dependent and nonindependent agencies was obviously important, but 
the agency enjoyed some leeway. 
At the same time, the independence of the agency may itself have 
been the result of political structure, though of a different kind. 
Agencies are often closely aligned with supportive oversight commit-
tees, which help protect them against presidential directives. As the 
legislative dominance literature has shown formally, this relationship 
may be an intended consequence of legislative organization and 
agency administrative structure. The importance of structure thus 
needs to be analyzed horizontally, as well as vertically. 
Indeed, as Herz shows quite well, the intersection between law 
44 See Strauss, supra note 36, at 592. 
4 5 On one level one could simply define this as politics and its impact another sign of the 
significance of poli tics on the outcomes. I am suggesting, however, that it represent something 
a little bit different-a common law type constraint on agency behavior. 
